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This paper investigates the agency problems associated with the public
management of a large financial asset portfolio.  After considering the relevant
theoretical and empirical literature, a set of institutional arrangements are
presented that should reduce the extent of the potential agency problems faced.
Key design features include: mechanisms for enhancing policy credibility; the
use of existing market mechanisms and regulation where possible; and the
creation of a public-sector institution to perform administrative functions.  The
paper does not consider the issues of optimal fiscal policy, or the appropriate
risk tolerance for the Crown, although the conclusions drawn from this study
may contribute to these debates.
Disclaimer: The views expressed are those of the author(s) and do not
necessarily reflect the views of the New Zealand Treasury.  The Treasury
takes no responsibility for any errors or omissions in, or for the
correctness of, the information contained in these working papers.1.0 INTRODUCTION
In this paper we investigate the nature of the agency problems associated with
the Crown managing a large financial asset portfolio.  A better understanding of
the agency relationships involved should help to shed light on the design of
appropriate governance arrangements for a public-sector fund.
The Crown currently holds approximately $11 billion of financial assets,
representing 18% of its total assets.  The Government also exercises direct
control over the management of a further $7 billion which are not recorded on
the Crown's statement of financial position.
The level of financial assets under management could increase substantially
over the next decade.  The Government's long-term fiscal strategy, as outlined
in the 1998 Fiscal Strategy Report, is to reduce net debt to 15% of GDP, and
then to continue to reduce it by running surpluses, on average, over the
economic cycle.
The magnitude of current and expected future financial asset holdings implies
that relatively small efficiency gains in the management of these assets could
have a materially positive impact on social welfare.  It is therefore important to
investigate ways of improving the efficiency of Crown financial asset
management.
The paper is structured as follows:
• part two describes the agency issues associated with a Crown managed
financial asset portfolio;
• part three discusses the relationship between fund governance
characteristics and investment performance; and
• part four presents the findings of the analysis on the institutional
arrangements most likely to contribute to reduced residual agency costs.3
2.0 AGENCY ISSUES IN THE MANAGEMENT OF CROWN PORTFOLIOS
[People] in general, and within limits, wish to behave economically, to make
their organisation "efficient" rather than wasteful.
Frank Knight
1
This postulate is known as the 'efficiency principle' and is based on the premise
that there are costs to carrying out transactions; that these costs differ
depending on the nature of the transaction and on the way it is organised; and
that people will generally attempt to economise on these costs [Coase (1937)].
A significant component of these transaction costs relate to efforts made to co-
ordinate and motivate individuals engaged in agency relationships.
An agency relationship is defined as:
… a contract under which one or more persons [the principal(s)] engage
another person [the agent] to perform some service on their behalf which
involves delegating some decision making authority to that agent.
Jensen and Meckling (1976)
The underlying premise of agency theory is that conflicts of interest can emerge
between principal and agent if they pursue different goals.  This is known as the
principal-agent problem and results in efficiency losses called agency costs.
A 'complete contract' could solve the agency problem.  It would specify
precisely what each party is to do in every possible circumstance and would
arrange the distribution of realised costs and benefits in each state so that each
party found it optimal to abide by the terms of the contract.
In reality, however, the bounded rationality of individuals and the existence of
imperfect information means that parties to a contractual relationship cannot
plan for all contingencies.  Moreover, if individuals are self-interested, the
existence of incomplete contracts leads to problems of opportunism (eg, moral
hazard and adverse selection) and imperfect commitment.
Various mechanisms can be used to facilitate incentive alignment.  For
example, ex ante efforts to assess agents' reliability, and ex post safeguards to
deter opportunism, can reduce the agency problem.  Inevitably, however, such
arrangements will be imperfect leading to a residual agency problem.
The literature defines three sources of agency costs
2: the expense incurred by
the principal in establishing appropriate incentives for the agent and in
                                           
1  "Review of Melville J. Herskovits' 'Economic Anthropology', Journal of Political Economy,
49, April 1941, pp. 246-258.
2  Appendix One describes the relationship between agency costs and the dimensions of
transactions.4
monitoring
3 the behaviour of the agent; the bonding costs incurred by the agent
to deter behaviour that is contrary to the principal's objectives; and the residual
inefficiency that occurs because the monitoring and bonding efforts will be
imperfect.  The challenge of institutional design is to minimise the sum of these
agency costs.
In terms of the management of Crown financial assets, two agency relationships
are important: that between the electorate and the Executive; and that between
the Executive and the investment manager(s).
2.1 The Electorate and the Executive
The electorate delegates sovereign power to the government through the
electoral process with the expectation that this power will be used to achieve
better welfare outcomes for society.  In practice, the Executive arm of the
government is responsible for making day-to-day fiscal management decisions.
The Executive is bound only by the New Zealand constitution which is broadly
interpreted to mean that, whilst the Queen reigns, the government rules as long
as it has the support of the House of Representatives.  Within this loose
accountability construct, there is considerable potential for opportunism due to:
• problems with voter preference revelation;
• the relative inability of the electorate to apply sanctions in the short-term;
• the informational advantages of the Executive over the electorate; and
• differences in the time-horizons faced by the Executive and the electorate.
The existence of divergent behaviour is also supported by public-choice theory,
which asserts that the government will behave so as to maximise its chances of
re-election.  The implication of this principal-agent problem is that the Executive
can be expected to behave inefficiently when there are surplus, liquid,
resources available to it.  In relation to the management of a large financial
asset portfolio, inefficiencies may manifest in the form of: direct raiding;
indirect-raiding; or an adverse impact on private-sector behaviour.
2.1.1Direct Raiding
Direct raiding is defined as:
… the situation that occurs when the value of assets under public
management is significantly below that implied by the performance of an
                                           
3  This involves more than just measuring or observing the behaviour of the agent.  It
includes all efforts on the part of the principal to achieve goal congruence or, alternatively,
to directly control the behaviour of the agent.5
efficient benchmark portfolio, and the ex ante projections of cash-flows into and
out of the Fund.
For example,  direct-raiding can take the form of:
• the misappropriation of dividends or asset sale proceeds (eg, when
disbursements are used for purposes other than originally intended);
• the imposition of constraints on asset management (eg, the imposition of
quasi-social or excessively prudent investment prescriptions); and
• an under-funded portfolio (also called pre-raiding), which occurs when the
ex ante required contributions are not paid to the Fund.
2.1.2 Indirect Raiding
Indirect-raiding, on the other hand, describes:
… the situation that occurs when the existence of liquid financial assets,
which are surplus to current financing requirements, leads to inefficient
spending or investment decisions by the Executive.
For example, a strong Crown financial position is likely to weaken the incentives
on the Executive to exhibit fiscal prudence.  In fact, historical evidence suggests
that the level of inefficient spending and investment by governments rises when
the government's finances are healthy [Alesina and Perotti (1995) and Bohn
(1991)].  On the other hand, there should always be some pressure to use
resources efficiently since tax-cuts are likely to be preferred by the electorate
over wasteful expenditure.
2.1.3  Adverse impact on private sector behaviour
Crown management of financial assets could affect private-sector behaviour in
a number of ways.  For example, there is potential for interference in the
commercial decisions of businesses if the Crown exercises its ownership rights.
Moreover, a strong Crown financial position may encourage the electorate to
place pressure on the Executive to engage in direct-raiding
4.  Political
involvement in the private-sector entities is likely to be inefficient if political
objectives clash with individuals' personal and commercial goals.
2.1.4.1 The Commitment Problem
Many of the problems above are known as commitment problems
5 (refer to
Kydland and Prescott (1977) for a good discussion).  The commitment problem
                                           
4  There could also be substitution between public and private savings although this is
outside the scope of this paper.
5  Appendix Two summarises the literature on credible commitment.6
is particularly acute in the public sector since it is impossible for sovereign
policy makers to bind the hands of future governments who will also have the
power to make, amend, and repeal laws and regulations.
Despite this, there are a number of ways of improving the credibility of Crown
commitments.  For example, legislation can be used to constrain the behaviour
of the government.  This can be effective when there are high political costs
associated with amending that legislation.  De-politicising a policy, by delegating
responsibility for it to an independent autonomous institution can also enhance
the credibility of the Executive's commitment towards a policy.
In addition, informal incentives can be relied upon to provide some credibility if
the threat of punishment is real [Barro and Gordon (1983)].  Policy measures
that enhance transparency, facilitate active monitoring, and strengthen political
accountability can be used to reduce the extent of these problems.
2.2 The Executive and the Investment Manager(s)
This agency relationship involves the Executive contracting investment
managers to manage the financial asset portfolio.  Since the contract will be
specified in terms of the objectives of the Executive, this relationship will also be
influenced by the relationship between the electorate and the Executive.
Even abstracting from the potential for political opportunism, however, a Crown
managed investment portfolio is expected to under-perform a comparable
privately managed portfolio [World Bank (1994)].  This is a result of imperfect
incentive alignment which is exacerbated by the existence of multiple and
conflicting objectives, and the absence of market disciplines.
For example, if the Executive specifies non-commercial objectives, or intervene
directly in the portfolio selection process, then it will be very difficult to measure
the performance of those Investment Managers and, hence, to establish
effective accountability arrangements.  The absence of a market for corporate
control, and weaker labour market pressures, are also likely to contribute to
under-performance relative to a private-sector benchmark.
Once again, there are a number of institutional design tools that can be used to
mitigate the extent of incentive misalignment between the Executive and the
Investment Manager(s).  These include measures to facilitate contestability, to
strengthen accountabilities, and to enhance transparency.7
3.0 EVIDENCE ON FUND GOVERNANCE AND PERFORMANCE
There is an abundance of empirical evidence suggesting that publicly managed
financial asset portfolios under-perform privately managed funds (of comparable
size and risk).  In addition, public funds frequently perform poorly relative to
leading market indices.  For example, Mitchell (1993) found that, for the period
1968-1983, US State and Local-Authority pension funds under-performed large
US private pension funds by 57 basis points per annum.  Lakonishok et al
(1992) also found that, on average, the equity component of tax-exempt funds
consistently under-performed the S&P 500 by approximately 130 basis points
before fees.
This raises two questions: first, do differences in governance arrangements
explain the differences in performance between private and public sector funds;
and, second, what characteristics of private sector funds contribute to their
success?  The following two sections consider these issues.
3.1 Fund performance and Governance Arrangements
A number of studies have attempted to explain these differences in investment
performance by exploring the differences in fund governance arrangements.  In
particular, the degree of contestability, the extent of non-commercial objectives,
the political independence of investment boards, and differences in regulatory
provisions have all been asserted to be significant determinants of investment
performance.
Degree of contestability
The threat of takeover, or loss of market share, imposed by competition is the
most effective mechanism for reducing agency costs in the private funds
management industry.  The effect of competition is to strengthen the incentives
of investment managers to invest efficiently, to reduce overheads, and to
increase the degree of voluntary disclosure.  The benefits of contestability are
enhanced when ownership of investments is vested in individuals, and when
funds are portable.
Lakonishock et al (1992) argue that the lack of competitive pressures faced by
public funds managers is a significant determinant of their under-performance
relative to private funds managers.  In particular, they assert that private-sector
mutual funds are selected in a competitive market on the basis of expected
future performance, and that this creates a survivorship bias in the sample of
mutual funds that is not evident in measures of public fund performance.  Free-
rider problems may prevent adequate monitoring of public-fund performance.8
Extent of Non-commercial objectives
A related issue is that the sponsors of tax-exempt pension funds appear willing
to pay for non-commercial services, such as 'well-defined products' and
investment approaches that are defendable ex post, when selecting investment
managers.  This provides investment managers with incentives to 'window
dress' their investment strategies to meet the needs of their sponsors.
Lakonishok et al also assert that the desire for non-commercial services might
bias the sponsors of public funds towards active management, since passive
management is perceived as reducing the importance of the investment
management function.  Moreover, the use of external investment managers and
advisers may be preferred because it facilitates the apportionment of blame in
the event of poor performance, rather than for economic reasons.
Political neutrality of Investment Boards
Mitchell (1993) found that Board composition was a significant determinant of
investment performance.  In particular, the greater the proportion of board
members appointed on non-performance related criteria, the lower the expected
returns on the portfolio.  Romano (1993) also found that fund earnings are
positively related to board independence, defined as the proportion of elected,
as opposed to appointed, board members.  Public pension funds with politically
appointed board members were found to under-perform public pension funds
with independent boards.
One reason for this may be the extent of so-called 'social investment
6'
associated with politically influenced boards.  Romano found that social
investments had a strong negative impact (ie, between 700 and 800 basis
points per annum) on public pension fund returns.
Another way in which political influence can affect investment performance, and
economic efficiency in general, is through interference in the corporate
governance role of public funds.  Whereas private pension funds typically
delegate responsibility for investment management to external funds managers,
public pension funds are more likely to manage their portfolios internally and to
actively vote their shares.  Even when external managers are used, public funds
tend to retain voting rights more frequently than private funds [Yerger and
Lightfoot (1991)].
Romano (1993) found evidence to suggest that fund voting practices are
roughly the same across all types of institutional investors and concluded that
differences in the source of pressure on public and private funds managers do
not necessarily translate to changes in voting practices.  However, the balance
                                           
6  Social investment are those investments with expected returns insufficient to compensate
for the level of risk exposure implied by the investment.9
of evidence still suggests that political interference in private sector investment
decisions has an adverse impact on fund returns and efficiency in general.
Regulatory differences
Regulation attempts to reduce the extent of residual agency costs by protecting
investors from fraudulent and imprudent behaviour by investment managers.
While regulatory environments differ substantially between jurisdictions, and
across entity types, most regimes impose a combination of information
disclosure requirements, and the imposition of fiduciary duties and legal liability
on trustees.  Some regimes go further and require holdings in certain types of
securities and apply explicit capital adequacy requirements.
From an examination of the experiences of compulsory retirement savings
schemes, light-handed regulatory regimes do not appear to result in a greater
level of insolvent funds.  Moreover, light-handed regimes are much less costly
and generate less inefficiency relative to stricter regimes.  Where strict regimes
have been imposed, they tend to be subsequently liberalised through time.
Statutorily imposed reporting requirements can also affect fund performance in
an adverse manner.  For example, where short-term return measures are
required, investment managers have been observed to 'window-dress'
performance in ways that may be detrimental to returns over the long-term.
Where reporting requirements are specified, care should be taken to ensure
that these do not generate perverse incentives.
Mitchell found that differences in regulatory environments also have an impact
on funding practices of public defined-benefit pension plans.  In general, public
sector funding practices were found to be more variable than in the private
sector.  This is due to the fact that solvency is normally a statutory requirement
for private-funds, whereas only some jurisdictions require solvent public-funds.
The degree of fiscal stress
7, for example, was found to be a significant
determinant of public pension funding rates (eg, a 1% increase in the
unemployment rate of a US State was found to be associated with a 6%
reduction in the funding rate for public pension funds in that State).
3.2 Fund Governance Arrangements in the Private Sector
In light of the observed under-performance of public-funds, it is worth
considering the governance characteristics of private funds that contribute to
their relative success.  Despite arrangements differing substantially between
private-sector funds, there are a number of common institutional features: the
arrangements between interested parties are typically contractually based;
regulatory frameworks underpin these contractual arrangements; and the
existence of competition acts to strengthen incentives to invest efficiently.
                                           
7  The definition of fiscal stress, in this context, is "the deviation of the current
unemployment rate from its long-run trend rate".10
Competition is the most effective mechanism for reducing agency costs in the
funds management industry.  The effect of competition is to lower administration
costs, improve the quality of investment processes, and to increase the degree
of voluntary disclosure.  However, difficulties in assessing the quality of
investment managers prior to contracting means that the market cannot be
relied upon completely to align incentives.
Regulation is generally relied upon to reduce the extent of residual agency
costs by protecting investors from fraudulent, or imprudent, behaviour by
investment managers.  While regulatory environments differ substantially
between jurisdictions, most involve a combination of information disclosure
requirements and the assignment of fiduciary duties and legal liability to
trustees.  Some regimes also include explicit solvency and compulsory
government security holdings.
Generally speaking, light-handed regimes are typically not associated with
significantly higher levels of insolvency.  Moreover, there are significant costs
associated with stricter regimes (eg, compliance monitoring and the costs
associated with distorted incentives).
Regulation too is imperfect.  For example, the close ties between trustees and
their advisers, and difficulties in performance measurement, mean that trustees
do not often replace investment managers who perform poorly.  For this reason,
contractual incentives are also important in reducing the residual agency cost.
Remuneration is the most commonly used incentive alignment mechanism in
investment management contracts in the private-sector.  Many funds managers
are paid fees based on a percentage of assets under management.  These
types of arrangements provide strong incentives for investment managers to
monitor the performance of their investments and to maximise returns.
Trust deeds are another form of contractual arrangement that are frequently
used to clarify the responsibility of trustees and to establish the rules of the
trust.  Indeed for many types of financial institutions, the existence of a trust
deed is compulsory.11
4.0 GOVERNANCE ARRANGEMENTS FOR PUBLICLY MANAGED FUNDS
Transaction cost economics is generally accepted as a useful framework for
approaching institutional design problems.  Consistent with this methodology,
the objective of institutional design should be to determine the least-cost
governance arrangements.
4.1 Over-arching Governance Arrangements
It is assumed, for the purposes of this paper, that the electorate has no means
of procuring the services of the Executive, other than by way of the electoral
process.  In the absence of a credible commitment by the Executive, the
potential agency costs associated with this relationship may be substantial.
Therefore, flexible credibility mechanisms must be developed in conjunction
with other institutional arrangements to ensure that both the policy and the
institutions are sustainable.
On the other hand, there are a variety of mechanisms available to the Executive
for procuring public services:
• provision by a public-sector organisation;
• regulation of service providers; or
• contracting private-sector providers.
The discussions in previous sections suggest that contracting with private
sector providers is likely to be most efficient in terms of reducing residual
agency costs.  The funds management industry is competitive and market
forces work effectively to strengthen the incentives of investment managers to
invest efficiently and effectively.
Public-sector provision, on the other hand, is likely to require significant initial
investment to ensure that the appropriate expertise and systems are in place.
The agency costs associated with a public-sector investment manager are
expected to be greater than those associated with a private manager due
weaker accountabilities and greater potential for direct-raiding.
Market procurement, however, is not without risk.  It is difficult to determine the
ex ante quality of investment managers and the Executive must bear the risk of
selecting a poor contractual partner.  In addition, ex post performance
measurement is difficult which leads to weaker monitoring of agents and moral
hazard problems.
These risks are implicit in all contracts with investment managers.  For this
reason, disclosure requirements and fiduciary duties are usually imposed on
investment managers to reduce the extent of informational asymmetries and to
provide for recourse in the event of negligence or imprudent behaviour.  There12
is no evidence to suggest that the regulatory environment in New Zealand is
ineffective at mitigating these problems.
The existence of a contractual relationship between the Executive and a
private-sector investment manager implies that some administrative functions
must reside in the public-sector.  Specifically, the administration of tender
processes; the specification of investment objectives; performance monitoring;
and contract management will all be required to ensure strong accountabilities
are maintained.
This 'broad brush' analysis suggests that the least-cost governance framework
is likely to involve:
• a credible commitment on the part of the Executive to manage the
financial asset portfolio as efficiently as possible;
• contracting with least-cost fund managers, given an appropriate risk
tolerance;
• an application of the existing regulatory regime; and
• a residual public-sector involvement to ensure adequate accountability.
The following sections expand on these features in more detail:
4.2 Achieving Credible Commitment
Some form of pre-commitment to ex ante policy settings is required, due to
time-consistency problems, before a policy can be considered optimal.  In the
absence of a credible commitment, any proposed institutional arrangements will
be 'second best'.  Hence, policy credibility mechanisms must be developed in
conjunction with other institutional arrangements to ensure that both the policy
and institutions are sustainable.
The literature on credible commitment (see Appendix Two for a summary)
establishes that informal incentives may be sufficient to achieve credibility if the
stated policy intention can be made transparent, and if real sanctions can be
applied in the event that the Executive reneges on its promises.
While the management of a financial asset portfolio lends itself to high degrees
of transparency, in terms of the specification of objectives and the measurement
of performance, the lack of any real sanctions associated with departures from
stated policy objectives (in the short-term anyway) implies that reliance on
informal incentives alone would be insufficient to achieve a credible
commitment that the portfolio would be managed in an efficient manner.
Therefore, formal constraints (eg, explicit legislation) are likely to be required to
enhance the credibility of any Crown investment management policy.  This may13
appear excessive, but is consistent with a number of legislative arrangements
already in place in New Zealand that are designed to achieve greater policy
credibility.
The Reserve Bank Act 1989 (RBA), for example, establishes the Reserve Bank
of New Zealand as an independent, apolitical, institution with the responsibility
for "formulating and implementing monetary policy … to promote [price]
stability" in line with the policy targets agreed between the Governor of the
Reserve Bank and the Minister of Finance.  In doing so, the RBA entrenches
and makes transparent the Government's commitment to price stability.
The Fiscal Responsibility Act 1994 enhances the Government's commitment to
prudent fiscal management by making transparent a set of principles for the
conduct of fiscal policy, and by requiring any deviations from stated objectives
to be justified in Parliament.  Similarly, the Public Finance Act 1989 enhances
the credibility of the Government's financial reporting by committing it to
producing accrual accounts prepared according to GAAP standards.
The establishment of an independent and autonomous authority, similar to the
Reserve Bank, could be used to strengthen the Government's commitment to
integrity of a public sector fund.  This entity could be made responsible for
specifying investment objectives and policies, within broad parameters agreed
by the Government, and could monitor and report on investment performance.
Making an independent authority responsible for the establishment of
investment objectives and policies should mitigate the potential for direct
interference in investment decisions by the Executive.  It should also reduce the
likelihood of misappropriation, although this issue is more complex than simply
placing constraints around disbursements of cash from the fund.
Without vesting the funds in individual accounts, it will be difficult to differentiate
between disbursements for eligible expenditure and that which is ineligible.  To
enable the ex post identification of direct raiding, the purpose for which the fund
is being established will need to be stated very clearly and appropriate
monitoring processes will need to be put in place.
Difficulties in forecasting expenditure over long time horizons are likely to make
it difficult to place strict constraints around fund disbursements.  In addition,
placing excessive constraints around the fund will reduce policy flexibility and
may undermine credibility.  Unless there is a high degree of transparency
surrounding a public fund, the Executive is likely to have an incentive to
manipulate the electorate's perceptions about the use of fund proceeds.
The creation of an ear-marked fund may improve credibility as long as an
appropriate balance can be struck between credibility and flexibility.  In general,
however, if vesting is involved then private-sector ownership and management
of assets is likely to be more efficient than public-ownership and management.14
The design of a transparent fund transfer mechanism may reduce these
problems.  For example, Norway has established a large public fund, using
accumulated oil reserves, which is used to finance the non-oil fiscal deficit.
Transparent mechanisms have been developed to surround the transfer of cash
to and from the Fund to reduce the potential for raiding
8.  Blatant
misappropriation of resources may be prevented by incorporating appropriate
objectives in the FRA, by publishing forecasts of expected contributions and
disbursements in key budget documentation, and by requiring justification of
any significant deviations in Parliament.
Securitising the asset portfolio may also contribute to the prevention of resource
misuse.  For example, a special purpose vehicle (SPV) could be established by
the Crown to act as an intermediary between the Crown and the investment
managers.  The SPV would then invest these funds, either directly or via
investment managers, in line with the mandate provided by the independent
investment authority.  In exchange for the payment to the SPV, the Crown
would receive non-tradeable pass-through debt securities.  The maturity of
these securities could be structured so as to match (roughly) the projected
expenditure stream, with penalties for early redemption.  To ensure the
incentives against early redemption are credible, the profits of the SPV would
need to accrue to a privately-owned organisation.  The benefits of this would
need to be assessed against the costs.
The pre-raiding problem is likely to be more acute than the potential for direct-
raiding.  This is because resources tagged for use as contributions to an
investment fund are likely to be more elastic than other items of government
expenditure, particularly during times of fiscal stress.  One mechanism that is
used where a measure of constitutional independence from Government control
is desirable is funding by way of permanent legislative authority.  Once again,
this is only likely to raise the political costs of reneging from stated policy
intentions.
The problems of indirect-raiding are more difficult to address since instances of
inefficient behaviour are not directly observable.  The potential for inefficient
fiscal management, however, is not specific to the situation of financial asset
ownership by the Crown.  Bradbury et al have argued that Crown expenditure
decisions are endogenous to the structure of the Crown's balance sheet,
particularly the level of gross financial assets.  In particular, spending and
investment decisions are likely to be considerably less efficient when there is
considerable 'slack' on the balance sheet.  The design of general budgetary
institutions to mitigate these problems is outside the scope of this paper.
                                           
8  Specifically, (1) the Norwegian Government is required to establish broad funding targets
in successive long-term programs; (2) within this framework the targeted annual transfer
is assessed and revised in the national budget; (3) Parliament approves the targeted
transfer as part of the Budget; and (4) the actual transfer is determined on an out-turn
basis and published.15
The policy measures described above may improve the degree of efficiency
with which a Crown financial asset portfolio might be managed.  This is mainly
achieved by raising the political costs of back-tracking on the Government's
stated policy intentions.  Ultimately, however, the magnitude of the costs
associated with pulling down the institutions will depend on the electorate's
commitment to the policy.  Pressure for increased expenditure, or reduced
taxes, is likely to be applied by the electorate, as well as by the Executive.
Therefore, the costs of dissolving these institutions may not be very high, and
policy credibility low, particularly during cyclical downturns in the economy.
4.3 Efficient Institutions given a Credible Policy
In an earlier section we concluded that using the market to contract least-cost
investment managers is likely to be the most efficient in terms of economising
on agency costs.  In saying this, there are a number of institutional design
features that should be built into any contractual arrangements to ensure that
strong accountability arrangements exist between the investment managers, the
administrators, and the Executive.
Achieving strong accountability arrangements involves:
• Clear specification of objectives, roles, and responsibilities;
• Establishing incentive structures that are aligned with objectives; and
• Developing effective monitoring systems.
4.3.1 Specification of Objectives, Roles and Responsibilities
Since the Crown bears the risk of adverse investment performance, the
Executive will need to retain control over the investment guidelines for any
Crown financial asset portfolio.  However, given the desire for political
independence, these guidelines should be based on the advice of an
independent investment expert.  To ensure that the Executive can be held
accountable for the performance of the financial asset portfolio, the agreed
investment guidelines should be tabled in Parliament.  This will enable the
Executive’s objectives to be challenged and will promote accountability.
The Executive should also outline the expected payments to and from the Fund
during the next three fiscal years, as part of the Budget process.  Again, to
promote political independence, these projections should be based on
independent actuarial assessments of the contributions required to finance the
proposeded expenditure track.
Maintaining ‘arms-length’ arrangements between investment managers,
administrators, and the Executive will be necessary to ensure clear separation
of roles and responsibilities.  An independent investment authority should be
established to:16
(i) provide advice to the Executive on appropriate investment guidelines;
(ii) appoint investment managers by way of competitive tender;
(iii) manage the contracts and relationships with investment managers;
(iv) monitor and report on fund performance; and
(v) apply sanctions/rewards consistent with the contractual arrangements.
To ensure incentive alignment, the independent investment authority should
also be delegated responsibility for investment performance, relative to the
benchmark investment strategy specified by the Executive.
Maintaining an ‘arms-length’ relationship between these functions and the
Executive should reduce the potential for direct-raiding, which has been shown
empirically to contribute to lower expected returns, allocative inefficiency, and
under-funding.
4.3.2 Establishing Incentive Structures that are aligned with Objectives
Competition, reputation, and rewards can all influence the degree to which
agents’ incentives are aligned with their principal’s objectives.  Contestable
tender processes place pressure on investment managers to reduce costs, offer
a better service, and to develop innovative approaches to achieving objectives.
An important part of the design of governance arrangements will be to ensure
that these competitive market pressures are maintained after contracts are
awarded.  This can be achieved by way of competitive re-tenders and contract
termination provisions in case of under-performance.
In saying this, care needs to be taken to ensure that the design of tender
processes do not lead to perverse incentives for investment managers to
‘window-dress’ their portfolios at the expense of long-term investment
performance.
The design of appropriate compensation contracts for investment managers
raises the issue of how to correctly measure performance.  This issue remains
largely unresolved despite more than 30 years work by academics and
practitioners.  Care will need to be taken in prescribing appropriate incentives
for investment managers to avoid establishing perverse incentives.
4.3.3 Effective monitoring systems
Once again, mechanisms for enhancing transparency play a large role in
facilitating the development of effective monitoring systems.  Reporting17
requirements will need to be developed that provide information for all
interested parties including the Executive, Parliament, and the general public.
The regulatory regime that applies to New Zealand fund managers also
encourages active monitoring, by promoting information disclosure.
The effectiveness of monitoring systems will be dependent on the
appropriateness of the benchmark portfolios against which performance is
measured.  Risk as well as returns will need to be monitored to ensure that
investments are compliant with guidelines and that adequate systems are in
place to prevent losses arising due to operational failures.
4.3.4 Summary and Conclusion
Appendix Three summarises diagrammatically the governance arrangements
that should surround a public-sector financial asset portfolio.  It is thought that
the potential problems of direct raiding and inefficient funds management could
be controlled, to a large extent, through the application of robust institutional
arrangements.
It is less clear, however, how we might control the costs associated with
reduced incentives to exhibit fiscal discipline in general.  Moreover, the large
potential size of a Crown net asset position, means the efficiency costs
associated with indirect-raiding may be large.  Due to the nature of the problem,
however, these costs are unlikely to be quantifiable.
This suggests that efficiency could be enhanced by placing some constraints
around the level of gross financial assets on the Crown's balance sheet.  This is
a matter for optimal fiscal policy design.  At some point, policy makers will need
to arrive at a subjective judgement on the likely size of efficiency costs
associated building up a large gross financial asset position, compared with the
expected efficiency gains of pre-funding future fiscal expenditure.18
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APPENDIX ONE
Agency Costs and the Dimensions of Transactions
The transaction cost literature discusses a number of characteristics of
transactions that can influence the magnitude of agency costs:
• the frequency with which they occur and their duration;
When a transactions is unique, we expect the parties to that transaction to use
whatever general mechanisms are available in society to govern that
transaction (eg, standard from contracts and court dispute resolution).  As the
frequency of transactions increases, contractual partners are likely to find it
more valuable to design their own low-cost routines.
Where parties are involved in long-term contractual relationships, they often
have opportunities to grant favours to, or withhold favours from, one another.
The threat of reciprocity greatly reduces the need for formal enforcement
mechanisms.
• the degree of complexity or uncertainty;
Koopmans (1957) distinguished between primary and secondary uncertainty:
the distinction being that primary uncertainty arises from random acts of nature
and unpredictable societal change, whereas secondary uncertainty arises from
a lack of communication between decision makers who are attempting to co-
ordinate.  The latter is often termed imperfect information.
The level of primary uncertainty influences the degree to which contractual
arrangements can be specified in detail.  Where uncertainty is high, contracts
are often relational and make use of adaptation and binding arbitration as
enforcement mechanisms.  On the other hand, low levels of primary uncertainty
(eg, spot contracts) enables tightly specified and formal mechanisms can be
relied upon to enforce contracts.
The existence of imperfect information, on the other hand, increases the
potential for opportunism.  To reduce the extent of imperfect information
problems, mechanisms such as disclosure requirements and contestability are
often used.
• the difficulty of measuring performance;
Williamson (1995) argues that all measurement problems are traceable to a
condition of "information impactedness", which occurs when:
(i) information is distributed asymmetrically between contractual parties,
and can only be equalised at great cost to one of the parties; or21
(ii) it is costly, or impossible, to inform an arbiter of the true information
should a dispute arise between opportunistic parties, each with an
identical knowledge of the situation.
Moral hazard is likely to factor in contractual relationships where performance
measurement is difficult.  The governance and contractual responses to
measurement problems that are observed in practice differ depending on the
origins of the problem.  For example, team organisation problems usually elicit
an incentive alignment response; quality uncertainty is often countered through
reputation effect mechanisms; and concerns over asset dissipation are often
mitigated by common ownership.
• the degree of contestability and asset specificity;
Economists generally recognise that the terms upon which a contractual
arrangement will be struck depends on whether non-collusive bids can be
elicited from more than one qualified supplier.  Monopolistic terms will obtain if
there is only one supplier, while competitive terms will result if there are many.
While this description of ex ante bidding is generally accepted, an
understanding of ex post competition is also required in order to understand the
contractual outcome in repeated transactions.  Whether ex post competition is
effective at controlling the agency problem will depend on whether the good or
service being provided is supported by investments in specific assets
9.
Where no specific investments are involved, the initial winning bidder realises
no advantages over non-winners in subsequent bidding contests.  In
circumstances where specific assets exist, the initial winning bidder often enjoys
advantages over non-winners when contracts are renewed.
There are a number of safeguards for protecting the principal against asset
specificity problems:
(i) realignment of incentives (eg, severance payments or penalties for
premature termination);
(ii) replacing court ordering with private ordering (eg, the use of arbitration
for dispute resolution);
(iii) allowing for adaptation by embedding transactions in a more complex
trading network (eg, expanding a trading relation from a unilateral to a
bilateral exchange through the use of reciprocity to equalise trading
hazards, or through recourse to collective decision-making under some
form of combined ownership of the specific assets).
                                           
9  Asset specificity is the degree to which an asset can be deployed to alternative uses and
by alternative users without sacrificing its productive value.22
APPENDIX TWO
Credible Commitment and Time Consistency
The governance arrangements surrounding a transaction are intended to reflect
how the parties to that transaction will act both now and in the future.  If the
contractual and other arrangements are to be effective at constraining residual
agency costs, the commitment made by the agent to principal must be credible.
Consider a simple two player game between principal and agent.  At the outset,
the two parties negotiate a set of governance arrangements that each believes
will be sufficient to achieve their objectives.  However, due to bounded
rationality and imperfect information, unforeseen future circumstances may
provide the agent with an incentive to renege on his/her agreed obligations.
This is known as the time-inconsistency problem.
Kydland and Prescott (1977) showed that an equilibrium of this game must
involve pre-commitment
10.  That is, the agent can only make its intentions
credible by binding itself ex ante to a proposed course of action.  Without this
pre-commitment, the principal knows that the agent may renege in future and
will ignore all promises made by the agent.  The only time-consistent equilibrium
of such a game is a Nash equilibrium
11.
The commitment problem is particularly acute in the context of public sector
since it is impossible for the Executive to bind the hands of future governments.
The existence of information asymmetries may also exacerbate the problem by
enabling the government to manipulate the beliefs of its electorate to its own
advantage.
For example, Nordhaus (1975) argued that democratically elected governments
are prone to use economic policy as a means of securing electoral gains.
Blackburn (1992) also asserted that economic policy is best understood as a
product of political bargaining and that any policy outcome should be seen as a
consequence of pressures exerted by groups of individuals with conflicting
interests.  If the power base upon which these compromises are made is
shifting continuously, it will be difficult to achieve credibility.
Despite these problems, the literature proposes a number of remedies to
reduce the extent of the commitment problem:
                                           
10  The importance of pre-commitment increases as the gap between the ex ante desired
outcomes and the possible ex post outcome becomes larger.  This, in turn, is a function
of the 'costs' associated with reneging.
11  A Nash equilibrium arises when there exists a strategy profile in which each player's part
is as good a response to what others are supposed to do, as any other strategy open to
that player.23
(i) formal constraints on policy making;
Explicit legislation that restricts the power of the Executive is the most drastic
means of improving the credibility of the Executive's commitments.  Statutory
codes of conduct, such as the Fiscal Responsibility Act in New Zealand, is an
example of this.  De-politicising a policy, by delegating responsibility for it to an
independent apolitical institution is another example of how formal constraints
can be applied.
It should be noted, however, that formal constraints can only every increase the
political costs of reneging on policy commitments; it can not remove the
possibility altogether.  In addition, apart from the risk of being arbitrary, formal
constraints may be inflexible and restrict the scope for adaptation in the future.
Such inflexibility will inevitably undermine the credibility of the public policy in
question.
(ii) informal incentive alignment mechanisms;
An important observation in the literature on credible commitment is that the
interaction between the Executive and the electorate is a repeated game.  The
electorate are unlikely to forget the actions of past government's and will no
doubt revise their expectations of future behaviour based on past experience.
Therefore, the Executive has reputation at stake when making decisions on
behalf of the electorate.
The implications of this can be summarised by the Folk theorem: the pre-
commitment equilibrium of a one-off game can be sustained as a Nash
equilibrium of a repeated game provided that the government is not too myopic.
In other words, the incentives for the Executive to renege on its promises may
be reduced by the threat of punishment [Barro and Gordon (1983)].
The use of inflation-indexed debt and foreign currency denominated bonds is an
example of the use of informal incentives to achieve credibility.  The use of such
instruments provides far-sighted governments with an incentive to invest wisely
and manage fiscal policy prudently, since attempting to erode the value of its
obligations will increase the Crown's future borrowing costs.
The extent to which informal incentives are an effective substitute for formal
constraints depends on: the transparency of the policy; its ability to be
monitored; and the severity of the threat of punishment.APPENDIX THREE
Governance Arrangements for a Public Fund Given a Credible Policy
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